Dennis Ross is currently the counselor and a Distinguished Ziegler Scholar for The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He spent twelve years as President George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s personal representative to the Middle East peace process. He helped broker such arrangements as the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, the 1995 Interim Agreement and the 1997 Hebron Accord. He is the author of the book, The Missing Peace – The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, a New York Times notable book. Ambassador Ross also directed the Berkley-Stanford program on Soviet International Behavior from 1984 to 1986. He received his doctorate from the University of California-Los Angeles in 1970.

Michigan Israel Observer: With a large population of Jews and Arabs, the University of Michigan’s debate on Israeli/Palestinian issues is polarized, often resulting in heated arguments that lead to more frustration and no understanding of the other side. Can you propose any solutions that will lead to more intellectually stimulating dialogue on campus?

Dennis Ross: Look, the only way to produce a dialogue is for both sides to create some kind of structure where they can talk to each other and where the going in premise is you make an effort to understand the concerns of the other. I can tell you in any mediation where we start is trying to see if there is any common ground, but the only way you make any significant headway is when you get each side to explain the concerns of the other. Not just to sort of say, ‘Alright, I’m going to listen to you,’ but also repeat it back. If you really understand what concerns me then why don’t you explain to me what it is you think that concerns me. If you were to create such a dialogue, and the ground rule was each side had to not just be willing to go and listen, but had to be prepared at an early stage to explain how they saw the concerns of the other side, then I think you’d begin to find a common language.

MIO: Do you feel Mahmoud Abbas is still a credible and legitimate figure representing the Palestinian people, or has Hamas’ victory and endemic Fatah corruption damaged his ability to effectively represent the Palestinian people?

DR: I don’t think it has damaged his ability to effectively represent the Palestinian people, but I think he is a symbol, he remains a symbol of authority, he remains a symbol of legitimacy. My concerns about Mahmoud Abbas are not his intentions and not his potential authority, it is that he very rarely seems to act on his authority, he very rarely seems to use it. Maybe he’s afraid that if we press him there won’t be a response or there will be the wrong response. But the problem is, the less you use your power, the less you use your authority, the less you’ll have it. So, I think he still has the capacity, I think he tends to under -utilize it.

MIO: How do you think the recent collaboration between Fatah and Hamas will help in achieving progress towards a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict?

DR: I think it’ll have very limited value in terms of trying to achieve a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Hamas has no interest in a resolution. They might have an interest in a respite. So the question is, with the right kind of mediation from the outside, you might be able to produce a serious ceasefire, a comprehensive ceasefire. But when I see that Ismail Haniya says, ‘“Well, I want to extend what we’re doing in Gaza to the West Bank,’” right now it is all one sided. The Israelis are not going back into Gaza, but the rocket fire continues, the smuggling and the weapons continue. So, I would be in favor of a serious effort in negotiating a ceasefire, where everything is worked out and nothing is left for debate. That, I think, is something that actually can be possible because Hamas for its own reasons may want a respite, and that can be a building block for the future. But we shouldn’t have illusions that Hamas is interested in negotiating a peace with Israel - they’re not.

MIO: Do you think Israel’s conditions before it recognizes a Hamas led government are unnecessarily strict? Can Israeli pressure force Hamas to accept its existence, or will it only radicalize Hamas further?

DR: I think that Israel shouldn’t change its conditions, but I think Israel should be prepared to say to Abu Mazen, Mahmoud Abbas, we will negotiate a ceasefire with you, you represent all Palestinians, including obviously your government that is led by a Hamas prime minister. We are prepared to negotiate a ceasefire with you, understanding that you’ll represent your government, and that means on your end that you will ensure there are no attacks against Israelis anywhere, you will stop the smuggling of arms, you’ll break up the bomb making labs, meaning that you’re not going to have an infrastructure for violence related arms. We, for our part, will stop all incursions, stop making arrests, stop targeted killings. But this isn’t just going to be slogans, it actually has to happen. We’ll define what a violation is, we’ll define what happens when there is a violation. We’ll create a sequence of steps to see that this in fact is being done. If both sides are living up to it, we’ll lift all the checkpoints. It can be something that can make life much better for both sides and that doesn’t require Israel to change any of its conditions. The truth is, it makes no sense for Israel to change its conditions because Hamas isn’t changing. And if Israel doesn’t change its conditions Hamas will decide that we can get whatever we want without having to change and then they don’t have to make any choices. It’s very important that Hamas understands that to become fully legitimate, it has to meet the conditions of the world and not just the Israelis. And meeting those conditions is a way for Hamas to become seen as a fully legitimate actor. They’ll say, well as long as we get votes from Palestinians, that’s all we need. Okay, fine, but then you remain cut off.

MIO: Do you think Israel will disengage from major settlements in the West Bank after the war with Lebanon this summer?

DR: I think it’s basically killed it. Look, the political basis for disengagement was lost. You can still disengage from the West Bank, but now it has to be mutual, it has to be based on negotiation, it has to be based on not only what Israel does, but also what the Palestinians will do. And it can’t be a case that Palestinians will make promises that they don’t have to fulfill. If they makes a promise they have to live up to it. That should be true with the Israelis, as well. The Israelis don’t always fulfill the promises they make. There should be a ground rule: if you make a deal and you have obligations, you fulfill your obligations. This should affect both sides equally.

MIO: In light of the recent difficulties with the settlers during the disengagement from Gaza, is the peace proposal made at Camp David in 2000, including the pullback of many more Israeli settlers, still a viable solution? If Israel had a trusted negotiating partner, would the political consequences of withdrawal still be too steep?

DR: Well, I think it is. But it’s only a viable solution if the Palestinians are also going to have a government that is committed to peace. You can’t pursue an end to an existential conflict which goes to the heart of self-definition and identity when one of the sides isn’t prepared to accept the other. The notion [is] that Hamas, you don’t have to pay attention to them, it doesn’t make any difference, let’s just deal with Abu Mazen and ignore Hamas. Well, that would be fine except that Hamas is the one that seems to control so much of what happens on the ground. So, again, I think it’s possible to get back to it from a settlers’ approach. But I think that the place to start is with a comprehensive ceasefire, and create some proving grounds first. To go for it now, when Hamas rejects the very premise of making peace, is, I think, pretty foolhardy.

There is no peacemaking that can be done easily. There is no peacemaking without risk and there is no peacemaking without costs. Ariel Sharon pulled out of Gaza and managed it, and the Israeli body politic accepted it. You could say that the West Bank is different, but in a sense what he did was demonstrate to the whole of the settlers’ constituency, its ability to block what they didn’t want was much weaker than people thought. The strength of the settler movement today in Israel is the absence of a Palestinian partner. If there was an unmistakable Palestinian partner, prepared to live up to its obligations and it was clear that peace would be a result, that peace and security would be the result, the Israeli body politic would support obviously far-reaching moves. They’ve already demonstrated that.

They’ve demonstrated it with the reaction to Barak before the intifada, after Camp David, when the Israeli press was wildly exaggerating what actually had been put on the table there, the Israeli public was prepared to accept it. So the reality is that the Israeli public is prepared to accept these kinds of far reaching moves, but not in the context where they see the Palestinian prime minister who says Israel doesn’t have a right to exist and we’re not going to recognize it. The Israeli public will go along when they believe they actually have a partner. If you look at the history of the conflict, whenever the Israeli public believes there is a partner, they’ll force the government to respond. And if the government doesn’t respond, the government is out. But the corollary to that is when they think they don’t have a partner, then they want a government in that makes clear what the consequences are of not being a partner.

MIO: Is the Road Map process still a worthwhile endeavor in achieving peace or do you think it has stalled and America needs to change directions?

DR: Well, I think the problem is the Road Map is nothing but a set of rhetorical guide posts. Because it was never negotiated with a party, both sides could say they accepted it, but both meant completely different things by it. You can’t make peace on the basis of two completely different understandings of what is involved. That’s a prescription for producing conflict, not for producing understanding. You have to create a common understanding of what is required. So, at this point, the Road Map could be relevant if the administration is prepared to invest in it. Truth be told, the administration was never prepared to invest in it. They put it out there, but they weren’t prepared to act into that.

MIO: Can a credible peace with Syria be achieved through negotiations regarding the Golan Heights and the Jordan River watershed? Is Bashar Assad’s government even stable enough for Israel to negotiate with?

DR: Oh, I think the government is stable enough to negotiate with; I don’t think that’s the issue. I think the issue is whether Bashar Assad is prepared to do it. On the one hand he says he’s prepared to talk to Israelis, but, you know, that’s interesting. On the other hand, the support for Hamas and Hezbollah suggests that he’s not prepared to give into the cards. The cards are themselves, as in the past, have always subverted any mutual peace. So, you would like to see some manifestation that Bashar Assad is actually prepared to do a peace deal. At this point, that’s still hard to see. It could be tested, and it probably should be tested.

MIO: The Iraq Study Group has suggested that the United States’ unconditional support for Israel is among the major factors driving the Iraqi insurgency. Is it reasonable to link the virulence of the insurgency in Iraq to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict?

DR: No, that’s ridiculous. If you didn’t have the Palestinian conflict tomorrow, you’d still have an insurgency that ended by violence, you’d still have shared militias. It’s completely unrelated. Even the notion that it would make it easier for the Syrian government to support us in Iraq. They don’t support us in Iraq because they don’t want sheer dominance; it has nothing to do with the Israelis and the Palestinians. Does the Israeli/Palestinian issue cast a shadow? Of course. Is it exploited by the radical Islamists, who appreciate followers? Absolutely. We should deal with it because we should deal with it, not because we see it as a form of linkage. It’s not linked to Iraq. The Iraq Study Group has made very good recommendations on Iraq, and it got to when it went beyond Iraq that’s when it began to be a far shakier solution.

MIO: What are Israel’s options if Iran tests a nuclear device? Would an Israeli first strike against Iranian nuclear facilities be an option? What would be the consequences of such a decision?

DR: Well, of course it’s an option. It’s a choice for Israel they are going to have to live with an Iran with nuclear weapons and Iran with nuclear weapons isn’t prepared to live with Israel. And then Israel doesn’t have a whole lot of choice. So, of course it has to be an option.

MIO: What are your thoughts on Jimmy Carters’ new book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid? CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations), a Saudi-funded group with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood is pushing for the book to be in libraries across America. What are your thoughts on having this book be available in libraries?

DR: Well, I think the book is written more as an indictment of Israel than it is a method to revitalize the peace process. The book presents a very distorted picture. The part of the book I know the best is simply wrong. It’s not debatable. It’s factually wrong. And everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but they’re not entitled to their own facts.