Bloodshed in Gaza
BloodShed In Gaza: FAtah and
hamas Clash
by
When Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman and leader of Fatah, called for new elections in December 2006, violent factional conflict between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, reached a peak after repeated clashes over the past year.1 During this period of infighting, both parties have violated ceasefire agreements, killing combatants and innocent bystanders alike. In early February, Fatah gunmen stormed Islamic University, Gaza’s main higher-education institution, and Hamas retaliated by attacking the Fatah-supported Al-Quds University.2 Fatah also accused Hamas of detaining its members and security officials at roadside checkpoints. In an effort to tighten its stronghold in northern Gaza, Hamas overran the headquarters of the Fatah-dominated Preventive Security Forces. Although the two political factions have now reached a consensus, the general agreement at the time was “Gaza is being burned down.”3 Many growing disparities between Fatah and Hamas contributed to the recent culmination of violence in Gaza. Tensions among Palestinians have peaked due to each party’s differing political and social foundations, the power vacuum left by Yasser Arafat’s death, and the clash of practical applications of power in governing the Palestinian people.
On February 7, 2007, exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas met with Saudi King Abdullah in Mecca intending to reach an agreement to stop the Palestinian infighting. If Hamas recognizes the existing peace agreements with Israel, an act that Abbas and Fatah support, the embargo imposed by the Middle East Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia) upon the Palestinian Authority can be lifted and aid from the West would resume.4 In Mecca, Hamas leader and Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh agreed with Abbas’ proposal to “respect international resolutions and the agreements signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization,” referring to the former peace accords with Israel.5 Abdullah’s support of the talks between Fatah and Hamas is indicative of the Saudis’ desire to maintain peace among Arabs, and potentially between Israelis and Palestinians. In 2002, Abdullah proposed the “Arab Peace Initiative” which advocates an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and an acceptance of a “just” settlement for Palestinian refugees.6 In return, the Palestinian government would “normalize” relations with Israel.7
After meeting in Mecca, Abbas and Mashaal agreed to form a new unity government, despite several previous failed attempts to combine the two parties in a united Palestinian government. Abbas and Mashaal have established that Hamas will hold nine cabinet seats and Fatah six, as opposed to Prime Minister Haniyeh’s earlier cabinet, which contained only Hamas Members of Parliament.8 The conception of the new unity government likely holds promise for peace between the two factions, and possibly an improvement in the relations between the Palestinian and Israeli governments. Although the peace process between the Israeli and Palestinian governments stalled under Arafat’s unitary rule, a divided PA only creates a more complex web of conflicts and renders all possible peace attempts futile.
Fatah was founded in the early 1960’s by Yasser Arafat and took control of the PLO in the late 1960’s. Hamas appeared on the scene in 1987 but only won the majority of the seats in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006.9 However, only recently has a violent struggle surfaced between the two parties. The question then, is why violence erupted in Gaza if both Fatah and Hamas are dedicated to serving the needs of the Palestinians, regardless of their outlook on Israel? The answer can surely be attributed to several different factors, all of which have reached a climax in recent months.
Differing Ideological Foundations
The foundation of much of the tension between the Fatah and Hamas political factions undoubtedly lies in each party’s ideological roots and the means that each favors to achieve its goals. Hamas, which is an acronym meaning ‘zeal’ and standing for Harakt al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Movement of the Islamic Resistance),10 demands the restoration of all historical Palestine to Palestinian rule. Hamas, an outgrowth of the influential Muslim Brotherhood, was founded during the first intifada. Its ideology included the belief that Palestinian territory should extend beyond the West Bank and Gaza and include all of its original land prior to the conception of the Israeli state.11 Hamas’ basis also included a dedication to social and political justice, and a compliance to coexist with the PLO.12 Recently, Hamas officials have implicitly suggested the acceptance of a two-state solution without overtly recognizing Israel.13 The Palestinian media has reported the development of a document that calls for the eventual creation of a Palestinian state following a five year armistice, in which Khaled Mashaal stated:
As a Palestinian, I speak today of the Palestinian and Arab demand for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. True, the meaning of this reality is that there is an entity, or state, called Israel on the rest of the Palestinian lands. This is a fact, and I do not refer to it in terms of recognition but as a fact that came about in [certain] historical circumstances.14
The PLO and Fatah also advocate the creation of a Palestinian state, but they do recognize the State of Israel. They do not demand that Israelis give up their current land, but they do support the Palestinian refugees’ right of return.15 Moreover, Hamas affirms jihad through armed conflict as a legitimate means by which a Palestinian state can be achieved. Article 13 of the Hamas Charter states: “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.”16 Conversely, Fatah renounced its armed struggle after the Oslo Accords in 1994, agreeing that this strategy was detrimental to peace with Israel.17
However, after Ariel Sharon’s intentionally incendiary display of Israel’s claim to sovereignty at the Temple Mount and the onset of the second intifada, the lines between Fatah and Hamas became blurred as both groups resorted to violence against Israel.18 Despite Fatah’s participation in the second intifada, Abbas later condemned this aggression toward Israel and its undesirable results. He claimed that the intifada resulted in Sharon’s popularity, fully occupied territories, and damaged public opinion of the Palestinian Authority.19 The intifada receieved the name “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” after the mosque on the Temple Mount that Sharon disturbed.20 The disparity between the ideological principles on which Fatah and Hamas are founded have likely contributed to the mounting violence in Gaza, but the agreement reached in Mecca holds promise for future reconciliation and collaboration amongst Palestinians.
The Power Struggle After Arafat
In addition to the factions’ differing foundational views on the place of violence, a long-lasting power struggle since Yasser Arafat’s death has led to armed conflict in recent months. Since its conception, Hamas has argued that the Fatah-dominated PLO should not be the Palestinians’ only representative,21 and Hamas initially opposed Abbas’ appointment as Prime Minister. Fatah has criticized Hamas for launching rockets at Israel, while Hamas has blamed the PA for not recognizing the death of Hamas martyrs. Furthermore, it is likely that many Fatah members who enjoyed privileges under Arafat have been struggling to retain their former influential positions under a recently Hamas-dominated government.22
Around the time of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the PLO began to lose popularity and Hamas gained support from many disillusioned Palestinians. After the failed negotiations at the Camp David Summit in 2000, in which then President Bill Clinton attempted to negotiate a final resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestinians began to become disenchanted with the PA and Fatah under Arafat. Charges of PA corruption furthered the decline of support for the PA and increased Hamas’ legitimacy as an alternative actor in government. After the 2003 talks in Cairo, it became increasingly clear to PA officials that Hamas intended to provide an alternative for the Palestinian people.23 This turn of events understandably proved undesirable for the members of Fatah and the leaders of the PA. Nevertheless, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal stated at the Cairo talks, “no one compete[s] for leadership and no one fight[s] for it… We insist that no organization have exclusive control over policy decision.”24 Regardless of each party’s claims, a clear and divisive struggle for power has hindered cooperation among Palestinians, and has contributed to the recent surge of violence in Gaza.
Hamas’ Continuing Resilience
Another notable discrepancy between Fatah and Hamas relates to their social bases and the actions each group has taken, not in response to Israel, but specifically for the Palestinian people. In 1987, Hamas emerged as a type of opposition to the more moderate and secular agendas of the exiled PLO leadership, with the goal of creating a Palestinian state on present Israeli territory. Hamas provided many social welfare programs that helped it garner grassroots support.25 Upon its conception, many Palestinians supported Hamas and its network of social welfare programs devoted to the well-being of Palestinian citizens.
Charity organizations continue to thrive in Palestinian territory and help bolster Hamas’ financial situation, in addition to the funds that Hamas receives from Tehran.26 Since the recent aid embargo, however, Hamas has entered an economic crisis and the majority of Palestinians have been living in poverty. Despite Hamas’ support from abroad and from the charities, Palestinians believe that the economic weakness of Hamas has indeed been directly detrimental to Palestinian prosperity.
In contrast to the relative popularity of a resilient but under-funded Hamas, Fatah under Yasser Arafat was viewed by many as entirely corrupt. Its members enjoyed numerous privileges, took bribes, and often ignored the needs of ordinary Palestinians. A few days after Hamas’ January 2006 victory, Attorney-General Ahmed Al Meghani stated that at least $700 million had been stolen in recent years, with much of that amount transferred into personal accounts.27 While in power, Arafat spent money generously and gave his loyal supporters authority over lucrative state monopolies. Many PA members that held office under Arafat have fled to Jordan and Egypt because of investigations conducted by Hamas.28 Because of this illegal squandering of Palestinian funds, the PLO has lacked the funds to provide sufficient social welfare programs for Palestinians, granting Hamas an opening and rendering Fatah less popular among many Palestinian citizens. Many hope that a unity government between Fatah and Hamas will end the aid embargo and resume payments into the Palestinian territory, and that with Arafat gone, incoming funds will be spent scrupulously and for the people.
Taking into account the ideologies, objectives, and courses of action of both Fatah and Hamas, the recent Palestinian party violence can be attributed to the culmination of burgeoning disparities since the cooperation of the two parties during the second intifada. Hamas has provided an alternative, albeit poorly funded, vision for the Palestinian people, replete with a social welfare network that Fatah could not provide.
Consequently, Fatah members are under pressure to regain their former influence in order to retain Western support and ensure an economically secure Palestinian territory. This growing opposition between the two Palestinian parties certainly contributed to the violent struggles in Gaza during these past few months and the resulting formation of the new unity government.
A Broader Struggle
The recent violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas can be viewed as a parallel to the tension between the United States and Iran in vying for control of the Middle East. In its current economic crisis, Hamas is now relying heavily on financial aid from Tehran.29 In December, Haniyeh stated that the notion of Palestinian isolation is an illusion; that Hamas is fully supported by Iran in their fight against Israel. Israeli estimates indicate that Iran generally gives three million dollars to Hamas each year, hardly making up for the lost aid payments or the tax and customs revenue that Israel has withheld from the PA.30 Similarly, the US government has been giving aid to Israel as well as the Fatah executive.31
The aid for Fatah has been channeled through neutral countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and is comprised of apparently non-lethal material intended to assist the presidential guard rather than be used directly against Hamas. The recent Palestinian infighting reflects this much larger struggle for power between East and West, and between religious and secular. This struggle is also currently exemplified in Lebanon, with a power consisting of Hizbullah backed by Syria and Tehran, against an anti-Syrian government backed by the United States. The outcome of this war of dominance will certainly have drastic consequences for both Arabs and Israelis, regardless of who gains primacy over the Middle East. Authority over the entire Middle East may be itself an unattainable goal for both Eastern and Western powers.
Israel’s Place in the Palestinian Conflict
The factional fighting between the Palestinian parties has left Israel seemingly and peculiarly on the sidelines of Middle Eastern affairs. During the factional clashes, many Israelis did not support interfering in the Palestinian conflict because the violence and deeply rooted tension was directed away from Israel. In a February 2007 Haaretz article, Vice Premier Shimon Peres was quoted as saying, “Our intervention will not help, on the contrary, it will draw all the fire toward Israel.”32 However, lack of unity between Fatah and Hamas also implies a hiatus of peace talks, and a delayed possibility of an Arab-Israeli compromise. The recent Mecca accords and the formation of the new unity government have presently resolved the discord between Fatah and Hamas, and can hopefully be viewed as a step in the direction towards compromise with Israel.
Judy Bankman is a sophomore from Columbia, Maryland, majoring in History. She is an assistant editor for The Michigan Israel Observer
Notes
1 Wilson, Scott. “Hamas and Fatah Act to Clear Way For Palestinian Unity Government.” Washington Post 16 February 2007.
2 “Gaza Calm as Fatah, Hamas Talk in Mecca” Morning Edition. National Public Radio. 8 February 2007.
3 al-Mughrabi, Nidal. “Gaza Fighting Escalates but Truce Efforts Renewed.” Reuters Foundation. (2 February 2007). 15 February 2007 <http://www.alertnet.org>.
4 Ibid
5 “Text of Mecca Accord for Palestinian Coalition Government.” Haaretz 8 February 2007.
6 “Israel and the Arabs: Let’s Meet, Maybe.” The Economist 8 March 2007.
7 McLeod, Scott. “A Critical Saudi Peace Initiative.” Time 4 March 2002.
8 Wilson
9 Myer, Greg. “Hamas Is Formally Asked to Form a New Government” New York Times 22 February 2006 (21 March 2007).
10 Levitt, Matthew. Hamas. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2006.
11 Yehoshua, Yael. “On the Conflict Between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.” The Middle East Media Research Institute: Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 143. (18 July 2003) 17 February 2007. <http://memri.org>.
12 Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994.
13 Fattah, Hassan M. “Palestinian Factions Agree to Creation of National Unity Government.” New York Times 9 February 2007.
14 Carmon, Y & Jacob, C. “Alongside its Islamist Ideology, Hamas Presents Pragmatic Positions.” The Middle East Media Research Institute: Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 322. (6 February 2007) 14 March 2007.<http://memri.org>.
15 Yehoshua.
16 Article 13, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement” 18 August 1988.
17 Yehoshua.
18 Ibid.
19 King, Laura. “Deadly Feud in Gaza Follows an Old Script.” L.A. Times (28 May 2006) 15 February 2007.<http://www.aijac.org>.
20 “Al Aqsa Intifada Timeline” BBC News 29 September 2004 (21 March 2007).
21 Yehoshua.
22 King, Laura. “Deadly Feud in Gaza Follows an Old Script.” L.A. Times. (28 May 2006) 15 February 2007.<http://www.aijac.org>.
23 Yehoshua.
24 Ibid.
25 Levitt, Matthew. Hamas. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2006.
26 Mitnick, Joshua. “Palestinian Charities Help Hamas Endure.” Christian Science Monitor. (16 October 2006) 20 February 2007.<http://www.csmonitor.com>.
27 Blanche, Ed. “Stamping Down on Corruption.” The Middle East. (June 2006) 16 February 2007.<http://proquest.umi.com>.
28 Ibid
29 Blanche. “Showdown” in Gaza: despite the rhetoric and the January visit of Condoleezza Rice to the region, another Middle East proxy war looms as the US and its allies arm Fatah and Iran bankrolls Hamas in the looming Palestinian power struggle” The Middle East 375. (February 2007) 18 February 2007.
30 “Seeking a Bypass, As the Money Runs Out” The Economist (11 May 2006) 21 March 2007.
31 Blanche “Showdown” 375.
32 Harel, Amos & Issachorff, Avi. “Peres: Israel must not intervene in Palestinian infighting in Gaza.” Haaretz. (4 February 2007) 16 February 2007. <http://www.haaretz.com>.
No. 4 . Spring 2007
No. 4 . Spring 2007